

What is the “Social” in “Social Development?”

“社会发展”中的“社会”是什么？

English Original

What is the “Social” in “Social Development?”

By Lois Holzman

Presented at the 2004 Conference of the Jean Piaget Society: Social Development, Social Inequalities and Social Justice, Toronto, May 2004.

While I chose to title my talk today “What is the ‘social’ in ‘social development?’” it could just as easily have been “What is ‘development’ in ‘social development?’” For the term ‘social development’ is, I believe, expressive of some fundamental philosophical biases that permeate psychology in general and developmental psychology in particular. Specifically, I will explore two assumptions concerning the subject matter of psychology: 1) there is development that is not social and 2) it is individuals that develop. I will offer an activity-theoretic conception of ‘the social’ and of ‘development’, one that has grown out of nearly thirty years of practice, and whose major intellectual influences have been Marx, Vygotsky and Wittgenstein. Methodological features of the works of Marx and Vygotsky will be presented; for discussion of Wittgenstein, see Holzman, 1997; Holzman and Mendez, 2003; Newman and Holzman, 1996, 1997).

To begin, what are the usual meanings of “social development?” In Austin’s terms, what things are we doing with these words? Sometimes the attribute ‘social’ is used to distinguish between what it is you’re referring to and some other kind of development, such as biological, physiological, emotional, cognitive on the one hand, or personal, organizational, individual on the other—which, presumably, are not social. Other times the attribute ‘social’ is used to characterize individuals, as when human beings are described as socially situated or socially constituted, or infants are characterized as socially competent, or social from birth. In both cases, the very act of attribution implicates the non-social as what is essential and the individual as primary.

And what of development? Most often it is understood as an internal process characteristic of individuals. Most psychologists have abandoned the notion of a “natural” unfolding of development (as in stage theories), accept at least a weak interactionist perspective and agree that development occurs “in a social world.” But few go on to explore the underlying assumptions (and implications) of this claim. The assumption I want to focus on today is that the unit that develops is the individual separated from (i.e., “in”) the world.

There have been many critiques of psychology’s unit of analysis, some that delineate how the primacy of the isolated individual has become an impediment not only to understanding human beings but also to addressing issues of inequality and injustice. Among those who have offered

中文翻译

“社会发展”中的“社会”是什么？

作者：洛伊丝·霍尔兹曼（Lois Holzman）

发表于 2004 年让·皮亚杰学会会议：社会发展、社会不平等与社会正义，多伦多，2004 年 5 月。

虽然我今天选择把演讲题为“‘社会发展’中的‘社会’是什么？”，但它同样可以被题为“‘社会发展’中的‘发展’是什么？”因为我认为，“社会发展”这一术语本身表达了某些根本性的哲学偏向，而这些偏向贯穿于一般心理学，尤其贯穿于发展心理学。具体而言，我将探讨关于心理学研究对象的两个假设：1）存在某种并非社会性的“发展”；2）发展的是个体。我将提出一种活动理论视角下对“社会”和“发展”的理解：这种理解生长于近三十年的实践，其主要思想资源来自马克思、维果茨基和维特根斯坦。本文将呈现马克思和维果茨基著作中的方法论特征；关于维特根斯坦的讨论，参见 Holzman, 1997; Holzman and Mendez, 2003; Newman and Holzman, 1996, 1997。

首先，“社会发展”通常是什么意思？用奥斯汀的话说，我们在使用这些词时究竟是在做什么？有时，“社会”这个属性词被用来把你所指的内容同其他类型的发展区分开来，例如一方面是生物的、生理的、情感的、认知的发展，另一方面是个人的、组织的、个体的发展——这些发展大概被预设并非社会性的。另一些时候，“社会”被用来刻画个体，例如当人类被描述为处于社会情境之中或由社会所构成，或者当婴儿被描述为具有社会能力，或自出生起便是社会性的。在这两种情况下，赋予“社会”这一属性的行为本身，都暗含着一种设定：非社会性才是本质性的，而个体才是首要的。

那么，“发展”又如何呢？它最常被理解为个体所特有的一种内部过程。大多数心理学家已经放弃了发展“自然展开”的观念（如阶段理论中所见），至少接受一种较弱的互动论视角，并同意发展发生在“一个社会世界之中”。但是，很少有人进一步探究这一说法背后的假设（以及它的含义）。今天我想聚焦的假设是：发展之单位，是一个与世界相分离的个体——也就是说，是一个“在”世界之中的个体。

对于心理学的分析单位，已有许多批判。其中一些批判指出，将孤立个体置于首要地位，不仅阻碍了我们理解人类，也阻碍了我们回应不平等与不正义的问题。提出替代性分析单位的

alternative units of analysis are socio-cultural activity theorists like Michael Cole who back in the 70s posited “the person-environment interface” as the proper unit of psychological study (Cole, Hood and McDermott, 1978; Hood, McDermott and Cole, 1980), and social constructionists like Kenneth Gergen and Sheila McNamee for whom “relationality” is the essential human characteristic (Gergen and McNamee, 1999; McNamee and Gergen, 1992).

Within developmental psychology, Erica Burman and John Morss are two “critical deconstructionists” of the concept of development (Burman, 1994; Morss, 1990, 1996). From different orientations, each of them points to developmental psychology's (sometimes subtextual) evolutionary framework as wedding it permanently to a dualism which separates the biological from the social, even in research designed explicitly to do away with that split (such as studies showing infants' predisposition to social interaction).

Further, Burman and Morss examine the politics of theorizing development as adaptation to what is. Taking their critique a step further, I suggest that in order to be ecologically and historically valid, an understanding of development must take into account not only the human capacity to adapt to society (whatever that society is), but also the capacity to reorganize and change it and, thereby, to create history. This clearly moves psychology's task beyond the study of what is into the study and practice of human transformation.

Perhaps not surprisingly, Karl Marx has played a significant role in helping some activity theorists to deconstruct the assumptions of developmental psychology. More than that, for me, he has provided a methodology for the construction of a more activist approach to human development. Especially in his early writings (for example, Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts and The German Ideology), Marx speaks of human development as transformative, not adaptive, and non-dualistically social:

... as society itself produces man as man, so it is produced by him. Activity and mind are social in their content as well as in their origin; they are social activity and social mind. (from the Economic and Political Manuscripts, Marx, 1967, p. 129)

While almost no one today would deny the social context of development, Marx saw no distinction between the so-called “outside world” and the “inside world” of the human being. For Marx, unlike for most of his followers, not to mention for most psychologists, there was no wall between the subjective and the socio-cultural. He saw the transformation of the world and of ourselves as human beings as one and the same task:

The coincidence of the changing of circumstances and of human activity or self-changing can be conceived and rationally understood only as revolutionary practice. (Theses on Feurbach, Marx, 1974, p. 121).

Thus, for Marx developmental activity is fundamentally social, communal and reconstructive—human beings exercising their power to create and recreate their world, which, he maintains, is inseparable from themselves. Helping people to relate to themselves and each other in this manner entails relating to them as world historic in everyday, mundane matters, that is, as social beings engaged in the life/history-making process of always becoming. This, of course, has profound implications for psychology. Instead of being the study of who people are and how they got that

人包括社会文化活动理论家，如迈克尔·科尔；早在 20 世纪 70 年代，他就把“人—环境界面”提出为心理学研究的适当单位（Cole, Hood and McDermott, 1978; Hood, McDermott and Cole, 1980）。也包括社会建构论者，如肯尼思·格根和希拉·麦克纳米；对他们而言，“关系性”才是人的本质特征（Gergen and McNamee, 1999; McNamee and Gergen, 1992）。

在发展心理学内部，埃丽卡·伯曼和约翰·莫尔是“发展”概念的两位“批判性解构者”（Burman, 1994; Morss, 1990, 1996）。他们分别从不同取向出发指出，发展心理学中那个（有时是潜文本层面的）进化论框架，使其永久地同一种把生物性与社会性相分离的二元论绑定在一起；甚至那些明确意图消除这种分裂的研究也是如此，例如关于婴儿具有社会互动倾向的研究。

进一步说，伯曼和莫尔考察了把发展理论化为对既有现实之适应的政治性。在他们批判的基础上再推进一步，我认为，要使对发展的理解具有生态学和历史学上的有效性，它就必须把人类适应社会（无论那是怎样的社会）的能力纳入考量，也必须把人类重新组织并改变社会、从而创造历史的能力纳入考量。这显然把心理学的任务从研究“已经是什么”，推进到了研究并实践人的转化。

也许并不令人意外，卡尔·马克思在帮助一些活动理论家解构发展心理学的假设方面发挥了重要作用。不止于此，对我而言，他还提供了一种方法论，使我们能够建构一种更具行动主义色彩的人类发展取向。特别是在他的早期著作中（例如《经济学哲学手稿》和《德意志意识形态》），马克思谈论的人类发展是转化性的，而非适应性的；并且是非二元论意义上的社会性的：

.....正如社会本身把人生产为人一样，社会也是由人生产出来的。活动和心灵在其内容上以及在其起源上都是社会的；它们是社会活动和社会心灵。（引自《经济学哲学手稿》，Marx, 1967, p. 129）

今天几乎没有人会否认发展的社会情境，然而马克思并不把所谓人的“外部世界”和“内部世界”区分开来。对马克思而言，不同于他的多数追随者，更不同于大多数心理学家，主观世界与社会文化世界之间并不存在一堵墙。他把世界的转化与我们作为人的自我转化看作同一项任务：

环境的改变和人的活动或自我改变的一致，只能被理解为并理性地把握为革命的实践。（《关于费尔巴哈的提纲》，Marx, 1974, p. 121）

因此，对马克思来说，发展活动从根本上是社会的、共同体性的和重构性的——人类行使其创造并再创造自身世界的力量，而马克思坚持认为，这个世界与人自身不可分割。帮助人们以这种方式同自己、同彼此发生关系，意味着在日常而平凡的事务中把他们作为具有世界历史性的存在来对待；也就是说，把他们作为社会性存在来对待，他们参与着不断生成的生命 / 历史创造过程。当然，这对心理学具有深远影响。由马克思的方法所启发的心理学，不再

way, a psychology informed by Marx's method becomes the activity of helping people become who they are not. And the activity of becoming is not the activity of an individual; it is a group, social activity. Here is where Vygotsky comes in.

Vygotsky, following Marx, recognized that if human development was a dialectical, socio-cultural-historical process, then the object of psychology's study needed to be not the intra-psychic state of individuals as they are, but the social activity of producing their becoming. This new ontological unit necessitated a further development of Marx's method: "The search for method becomes one of the most important problems of the entire enterprise of understanding the uniquely human forms of psychological activity," Vygotsky wrote. "In this case, the method is simultaneously prerequisite and product, the tool and the result of the study" (Vygotsky, 1978, p. 65).

Here Vygotsky breaks with the accepted scientific paradigm, in which method is understood as a tool that, when applied, yields results. With this old model, the relation between tool and result is linear, instrumental and dualistic (tool for result). Vygotsky is proposing a non-linear, non-instrumental, non-dualistic method—a dialectical method—in which the "tool" and the "result" come into existence together. They are neither separate nor identical, but elements of a unity (totality, whole). Vygotsky is relating to the totality, not to any particular. His great contribution to psychology was to bring to it Marx's discovery that human development and learning—on the individual, societal and species levels—involves the transformation of totalities, not the changing of so-called individual particulars. Vygotsky understood human development as a cultural activity that people engage in together, rather than as the external manifestation of an individualized, internal process.

Vygotsky's understanding of the relationship between learning and development is an illustration of his dialectical tool-and-result methodology. Learning was, to him, both the source and the product of development, just as development was both the source and the product of learning. As activity (as opposed to abstracted concepts), learning and development are inseparably intertwined and emergent, best understood together as a whole (unity). Their relationship is dialectical, not linear or temporal (one doesn't come before the other) or causal (one isn't the cause of the other).

Vygotsky's discovery of what he called the zone of proximal development (zpd) grew out of the use of this methodology in the study of how children learn and develop. He wrote: "Every function in the child's cultural development appears twice: first on the social level and later, on the individual level; first between people (interpsychological), and then inside the child (intrapsychological). This applies equally to all voluntary attention, to logical memory, and to the formation of concepts. All the higher mental functions originate as actual relations between people" (Vygotsky, 1978, p. 57).

Thus, the person, the mind, development, learning, psychological processes such as thinking, speaking, remembering, problem solving, and so on, are created or produced through participation in and internalization of social-cultural-historical forms of activity. Vygotsky was neither the first nor the last to notice that children (and adults) can "do more" in collaboration with others. But it was he who specified the social-cultural-historical process by which this occurs.

One of his most wonderful illustrations of the zpd is the learning-development of language. Vygotsky vividly described how babies transform from babblers to speakers of a language through

是研究人们“是谁”以及“如何成为那样”的学科，而成为帮助人们成为他们尚未是之人的活动。而“生成”这一活动并不是个体的活动；它是群体的、社会的活动。这正是维果茨基登场的地方。

维果茨基追随马克思，认识到如果人类发展是一个辩证的、社会—文化—历史的过程，那么心理学研究的对象就不应是个体当下所处的内在心理状态，而应是生成其“正在成为”的社会活动。这个新的本体论单位要求对马克思的方法作进一步发展。维果茨基写道：“寻找方法成为理解人类特有心理活动形式这一整个事业中最重要的问题之一。在这种情况下，方法同时是研究的前提和产物，是研究的工具和结果”（Vygotsky, 1978, p. 65）。

在这里，维果茨基同被接受的科学范式发生了断裂。在那个范式中，方法被理解为一种工具，一经应用便产生结果。在这一旧模型中，工具与结果之间的关系是线性的、工具性的和二元论的（工具为了结果）。维果茨基提出的是一种非线性、非工具性、非二元论的方法——一种辩证的方法——在这种方法中，“工具”和“结果”共同生成。它们既不是彼此分离的，也不是同一的，而是一个统一体（总体、整体）的要素。维果茨基所面对的是总体，而不是任何个别物。他对心理学的伟大贡献，是把马克思的发现带入心理学：人类的发展和 learning——无论在个体、社会还是物种层面——都涉及总体的转化，而不是所谓个别要素的改变。维果茨基把人类发展理解为人们共同参与的文化活动，而不是一个个体化内部过程的外在表现。

维果茨基对学习与发展之间关系的理解，正是其辩证的“工具—结果”方法论的一个说明。对他来说，学习既是发展的来源，也是发展的产物；正如发展既是学习的来源，也是学习的产物。作为活动（而非抽象概念），学习与发展不可分割地交织在一起，并在其中涌现；最好把二者作为一个整体（统一体）来理解。它们的关系是辩证的，而不是线性的或时间顺序上的（并不是一个先于另一个），也不是因果性的（并不是一个导致另一个）。

维果茨基对他所谓“最近发展区”（zone of proximal development, ZPD）的发现，正是源自于他在研究儿童如何学习和发展时对这种方法论的运用。他写道：“儿童文化发展中的每一种功能都会出现两次：先是在社会层面上，随后是在个体层面上；先是在人与人之间（心理间的），然后是在儿童内部（心理内的）。这一点同样适用于所有随意注意、逻辑记忆以及概念的形成。所有高级心理功能都起源于人与人之间的实际关系”（Vygotsky, 1978, p. 57）。

因此，个人、心灵、发展、学习，以及思考、说话、记忆、解决问题等心理过程，都是通过参与并内化社会—文化—历史形式的活动而被创造或生产出来的。维果茨基并不是第一个、也不是最后一个注意到儿童（以及成人）能够在与他人合作中“做得更多”的人。但正是他明确说明了这一切得以发生的社会—文化—历史过程。

维果茨基关于 ZPD 最精彩的说明之一，是语言的学习—发展。他生动地描述了婴儿如何通过表演，从咿呀学语者转化为一种语言的说话者。语言学习的 ZPD 是一种环境，它支持婴

performing. The language-learning zpd is an environment that supports the baby to speak when it doesn't know how to, that is, to perform as a speaker. Vygotsky observed that children become speakers of language through the performance of conversations that they and their caregivers create. The babbling baby's rudimentary speech is a creative imitation of the more developed speaker's speech. At the same time, the more developed speakers complete the baby and immediately accept her/him into the community of speakers. They neither give very young children a grammar book and dictionary to study, nor reprimand and correct them. Instead, they relate to them as capable of far more than they could possibly do; they relate to them as speakers, feelers, thinkers and makers of meaning. This is what makes it possible for very young children to do what they are not yet capable of. In this way, we can say that they are performing beyond themselves as speakers or, as Vygotsky says, "performing a head taller than they are" (Vygotsky, 1978, p. 102). When they are playing with language in this way in creating the language-learning zpd, babies are simultaneously performing—becoming—themselves. Performing is a way of taking "who we are" and creating something new—in this case, a new speaker—through incorporating "the other" (Holzman, 1999, 2000; Newman and Holzman, 1993).

While Vygotsky's research focused on children, his concept of the zpd and his discovery that children develop through "creative imitation" and performance has implications beyond the specifics of child development. The work of my colleague Fred Newman, myself and others has built on Vygotsky's work and extended far beyond the perimeters of child development.

To us, the zpd is a rejection of the individuated learning and development model that dominates psychology. Beyond rejection, however, it offers a positive alternative that respects the relationality and creativity of human life. (Creating) stages for development seems, to us, a more apt characterization of the developmental process than (going through) stages of development.

The zpd does away with developmental psychology's dualism—which it shares with much of modernist thought—that insists on dichotomies such as individual and society, inner and outer, subjective and objective, and suggests a new way of looking at what human beings do. First, the zpd suggests that people do not "come to know the world," nor do they "act upon it" or "construct" it, for such statements subtextually embody a separation of human beings and the world, resulting in the necessity of employing an abstract explanatory mode in order to understand how "in the world" an individual develops. Second, seeing the zpd as the life space in which and how we all live—inseparable from the we who produce it—frees us from seeking causal connection. The zpd is the socially-historically-culturally produced environment in which and how human beings organize and reorganize their relationships to each other and to nature. It is where and how human beings—determined, to be sure, by sometimes empirically observable circumstances—totally transform these very circumstances, creating something new. The zpd, then, is simultaneously the production of development and the environment that makes development possible—and zpd's can be created by human beings in all arenas of life (Newman and Holzman, 1993).

My work as a developmental psychologist has, for the last 30 years, involved creating zpd's, that is, building practices that grow out the methodology proposed by Marx and developed by Vygotsky. Known as social therapy, it was initially developed by philosopher Fred Newman in the mid-1970s, and continues to be advanced as a method for human development and community building at the East Side Institute for Group and Short Term Psychotherapy, which I co-founded with Newman.

儿在尚不知道如何说话时说话，也就是说，作为说话者进行表演。维果茨基观察到，儿童之所以成为语言的说话者，是通过他们与照护者共同创造的“对话”表演而实现的。咿呀学语的婴儿所发出的初步言语，是对发展程度更高的说话者言语的一种创造性模仿。与此同时，发展程度更高的说话者对婴儿进行“补全”，并立即把她/他接纳进说话者共同体。他们既不会给非常年幼的孩子一本语法书和一本词典去学习，也不会斥责和纠正他们。相反，他们把孩子当作能够做到远远超过其实际能力之事的人来对待；他们把孩子当作说话者、感受者、思考者和意义创造者来对待。正是这一点，使非常年幼的孩子能够去做他们尚未具备能力去做的事情。由此我们可以说，作为说话者，他们正在超越自身进行表演；或者用维果茨基的话说，是“比他们自己高出一个头地表演”（Vygotsky, 1978, p. 102）。当婴儿以这种方式玩语言、共同创造语言学习的 ZPD 时，他们同时也在表演——生成——他们自己。表演是一种方式：把“我们是谁”拿来，通过纳入“他者”而创造出某种新的东西——在这里，就是一个新的说话者（Holzman, 1999, 2000; Newman and Holzman, 1993）。

尽管维果茨基的研究聚焦于儿童，他的 ZPD 概念以及他关于儿童通过“创造性模仿”和表演而发展的发现，其意义远远超出了儿童发展的具体范围。我和我的同事弗雷德·纽曼以及其他人的工作，正是在维果茨基工作的基础上展开，并已远远超出儿童发展的边界。

在我们看来，ZPD 是对主导心理学的个体化学习与发展模型的拒绝。然而，它不只是拒绝；它还提供了一个积极的替代方案，一个尊重人类生活的关系性和创造性的方案。对我们来说，用“（创造）发展的舞台”来描述发展过程，要比用“（经历）发展的阶段”更为恰当。

ZPD 取消了发展心理学的二元论——这种二元论也为许多现代主义思想所共有，它坚持诸如个体与社会、内在与外在、主观与客观之类的二分。ZPD 提出了一种看待人类所做之事的新方式。首先，ZPD 表明，人并不是“逐渐认识世界”，也不是“作用于世界”或“建构”世界，因为这些说法在潜文本中都包含了人与世界的分离，并由此导致一种必要性：必须采用抽象的解释模式，才能理解一个个体如何“在世界中”发展。其次，把 ZPD 看作我们所有人生活于其中并借以生活的生命空间——且它与生产它的“我们”不可分割——便使我们从追寻因果联系中解放出来。ZPD 是一个由社会、历史和文化生产出来的环境；在其中，也通过它，人类组织并重新组织彼此之间以及与自然之间的关系。正是在这里，也正是通过这种方式，人类——当然受到某些有时可以经验观察到的环境条件所规定——又彻底转化这些环境本身，创造出新的东西。因此，ZPD 同时是发展的生产，也是使发展成为可能的环境；而人类可以在生活的所有领域中创造 ZPD（Newman and Holzman, 1993）。

过去 30 年来，我作为发展心理学家的工作一直关乎创造 ZPD；也就是说，建构那些从马克思所提出并由维果茨基发展的方法论中生长出来的实践。这一方法被称为社会疗愈，最初由哲学家弗雷德·纽曼在 20 世纪 70 年代中期发展出来，并在“东区群体与短程心理治疗研究所”（East Side Institute for Group and Short Term Psychotherapy）持续推进，作为一种促进人类发展和共同体建构的方法；该研究所由我与纽曼共同创立。

As a psychotherapy, it is practiced at social therapy centers and other clinics, and in schools, hospitals and social service organizations. But more broadly, the social therapeutic approach is a method for social-emotional growth and learning that is the foundation for dozens of programs in the areas of youth development, in school and outside of school education and mental health (Feldman and Silverman, 2004; Gildin, 2003; Holzman, 1997, 2000; Lobman, under review, 2003; Sabo, 2003); training and practice in medicine and healthcare (Massad, 2003); and organizational development and executive leadership (Salit, 2003). Through training and study opportunities, public events and collaborative projects, the East Side Institute makes it possible for people worldwide to learn and contribute to the social therapeutic perspective and other new psychologies.

Over these nearly thirty years, the unit we work with is the group, not the individual. For example, the task of a social therapy group (to which diverse people have come to get help with emotional pain and problems) is to create itself, or what social therapists call “building the group” (Holzman and Mendez, 2003). Similarly, the ten-year old school-based mental health program at Erasmus High School in Brooklyn, which the students named, “Let’s Talk About It,” works by virtue of the young people continuously creating their group (Feldman and Silverman, 2004). For twelve years, we ran an experimental elementary school, the Barbara Taylor School, in which adults and students from 3 to 13 had the collective responsibility to create their school as a place where all could learn developmentally (Holzman, 1997). The twenty year-old All Stars Talent Show Network involves 20,000 young people, ages 3 – 21, annually in creating talent shows in poor neighborhoods in New York and other cities. More than a mere talent show, however, the All Stars provides youth the opportunity to create new performances off stage as well as on stage, as they build their organization, make a positive statement in and to their communities, and build new kinds of relationships with their adult supporters and donors (Gildin, 2003).

In every case, the focus of the work and the “group-reflexivity” is, “How well is the group performing its activity?”—and not “How is each individual doing?” This is the relevant developmental question because people—no matter what age—grow by growing the groups they are in.

The claim I am making is that approaching human development from the dualist perspective that separates the social from the developmental and the individual from the group has limited the development of developmental psychology. The practice of my colleagues and I has demonstrated the value—indeed, the necessity—of people organizing themselves as social units in order to carry out the tasks of learning and growing. There are obviously countless other human endeavors in which people become organized as social units to get a specific job done: manufacturing, team sports, theatrical and other performance activities—not to mention the military. What we have shown through our practice is that such a group approach is also necessary for the emotional and intellectual development of our species.

In social therapy, it works roughly like this. People come into social therapy groups as they come into any therapy or any group—individuated, commodified and alienated. Shaped by an individuated learning-development model, they want help to change and/or feel better as individuals—an impossibility, we believe, following Vygotsky and Marx. In order to grow emotionally this individuated model must be practically critically challenged through the creating of a new socialized helping environment (zpd). What social therapists refer to as “building the group” is the deconstructive-reconstructive process in which people come face to face with the limitations of trying to grow as individuals as they participate in the process of collective growing.

作为一种心理治疗，它在社会疗愈中心和其他诊所，以及学校、医院和社会服务机构中实践。但更广义地说，社会疗愈取向是一种促进社会—情感成长与学习的方法，是数十个项目的基础，这些项目涉及青少年发展、校内与校外教育以及心理健康（Feldman and Silverman, 2004; Gildin, 2003; Holzman, 1997, 2000; Lobman, under review, 2003; Sabo, 2003）；医学与健康照护中的培训和实践（Massad, 2003）；以及组织发展和高管领导力（Salit, 2003）。通过培训和学习机会、公共活动以及合作项目，东区研究所使世界各地的人们能够学习并参与贡献社会疗愈视角和其他新的心理学。

在这近三十年中，我们工作的单位一直是群体，而不是个体。例如，一个社会疗愈小组（不同的人带着情感痛苦和问题来到这里寻求帮助）的任务，是创造它自己，或者用社会疗愈师的话说，是“建构群体”（Holzman and Mendez, 2003）。类似地，布鲁克林伊拉斯谟高中一个已有十年历史的校本心理健康项目——学生们把它命名为“让我们谈谈吧”（Let’s Talk About It）——之所以得以运作，正是因为年轻人持续不断地创造他们的群体（Feldman and Silverman, 2004）。有十二年时间，我们运营了一所实验性小学——芭芭拉·泰勒学校；在其中，成人和 3 至 13 岁的学生共同承担责任，把学校创造为一个所有人都能够以发展性方式学习的地方（Holzman, 1997）。已有二十年历史的“全明星才艺秀网络”（All Stars Talent Show Network）每年让 20,000 名 3 至 21 岁的年轻人在纽约和其他城市的贫困社区中创造才艺秀。然而，全明星远不止是一场才艺秀；它为青年人提供机会，让他们在舞台上和舞台下都创造新的表演：他们建构自己的组织，在自己的共同体中并向共同体作出积极表达，并与成年支持者和捐赠者建立新型关系（Gildin, 2003）。

在每一种情形中，工作的焦点以及“群体反思性”的焦点都是：“这个群体在多大程度上表演着它的活动？”——而不是“每个个体表现如何？”这才是相关的发展性问题，因为人们——无论年龄大小——都是通过使自己所在的群体成长而成长的。

我要提出的是：以一种把社会性与发展性相分离、把个体与群体相分离的二元论视角来理解人类发展，已经限制了发展心理学自身的发展。我和同事们的实践已经证明，为了承担学习和成长的任务，人们把自己组织成社会单位具有价值——事实上具有必要性。显然，还有无数其他人类事业也要求人们组织成社会单位，以完成某项具体工作：制造业、团队运动、戏剧以及其他表演活动——更不用说军队了。我们的实践所显示的是，这样一种群体取向对于我们这个物种的情感和智力发展同样是必要的。

在社会疗愈中，其运作大致如下。人们进入社会疗愈小组，就像进入任何治疗或任何群体一样——是被个体化、商品化和异化的。由于受到个体化学习—发展模型的塑造，他们希望作为个体获得帮助、发生改变和/或感觉更好——而追随维果茨基和马克思，我们认为这是一件不可能的事。为了在情感上成长，这一个体化模型必须通过创造一个新的社会化助人环境（ZPD）而在实践中受到批判性挑战。社会疗愈师所说的“建构群体”，就是一个解构—重构过程：人们在参与集体成长的过程中，直面试图作为个体成长的局限。新的情感成长之所以发生，是因为人们通过创造它而学会了一种活动——如何使群体成长（Holzman and

New emotional growth occurs by virtue of having learned— through creating it—the activity of how to make groups grow (Holzman and Mendez, 2003).

Making groups grow (and growing by virtue of this collective activity) is accomplished, as far as we can tell, through the exercise of the human capacity to perform. As childhood shows, we are able to become what we are not (if we were not, there would be no development, no civilization, no history). We are performers. But, as Vygotsky has shown, we cannot perform as individuals. As individuals we can, at best, behave. We perform only as a group. People learn how to build the group and to realize that growth comes from participating in the process of building the groups in which one functions. This new learning, in Vygotskian fashion, rekindles development— development by virtue of the group growing.

I could talk all day about the discoveries our practice has kindled. What I hope to leave you with, however, is simply the knowledge that there is a living alternative out there to the conventions and assumptions of psychology's individualistic bias. An alternative that relates to human beings not as objects to be adapted to the world as it is, but as social beings that can change themselves and the world-- an alternative that has touched and involves many thousands of people in its creation.

What is the “social” in “social development?” Everything.

References

Burman, E. (1994). Deconstructing developmental psychology. London: Routledge.

Cole, M., Hood, L. and McDermott, R.P. (1978). Ecological niche picking: Ecological invalidity as an axiom of experimental cognitive psychology. Unpublished manuscript, New York: The Rockefeller University.

Feldman, N. and Silverman, B. (2004). The "Let's Talk About It" model: Engaging young people as partners in creating their own mental health program. In K. E. Richardson (Ed.), *Advances in school-based mental health: Best practices and program models*. Kingston, NJ: Civic Research Institute.

Gergen, K. J., McNamee, S. and Associates (1999). *Relational responsibility: Resources for sustainable dialogue*. Thousand Oaks CA: Sage.

Gildin, B. L. (2003). All Stars Talent Show Network: Grassroots funding, community building and participatory evaluation. *Youth Participatory Evaluation: A Field in the Making, Special Issue of New Directions for Evaluation*, no. 98, 77-85.

Holzman, L. (1997). *Schools for growth: Radical alternatives to current educational models*. Mahwah NJ: Erlbaum.

Holzman, L. (1999). *Life as performance (Can you practice psychology if there's nothing that's*

Mendez, 2003) .

就我们目前所能理解的而言，使群体成长（并凭借这一集体活动而成长）是通过行使人类的表演能力来实现的。正如童年所显示的，我们能够成为我们尚未是之人（如果我们不能如此，就不会有发展，不会有文明，也不会有历史）。我们是表演者。但是，正如维果茨基所表明的，我们不能作为个体来表演。作为个体，我们充其量只能行为。我们只作为群体来表演。人们学习如何建构群体，并认识到成长来自参与建构自己在其中发挥作用的群体这一过程。这种新的学习，以维果茨基的方式，重新点燃了发展——一种凭借群体成长而发生的发展。

我可以花上一整天谈论我们的实践所点燃的种种发现。然而，我希望留给你的，只是这样一个认识：在心理学个人主义偏向的惯例和假设之外，确实存在一种活生生的替代方案。它不是把人类当作需要适应既有世界的对象来对待，而是把人类作为能够改变自身和世界的社会性存在来对待——这一替代方案在其创造过程中已经触及并卷入了成千上万的人。

“社会发展”中的“社会”是什么？是一切。

参考文献

Burman, E. (1994). 《解构发展心理学》。伦敦: Routledge.

Cole, M., Hood, L. and McDermott, R.P. (1978). 《生态位选择：作为实验认知心理学公理的生态无效性》。未发表手稿，纽约：洛克菲勒大学。

Feldman, N. and Silverman, B. (2004). “‘让我们谈谈吧’模式：让年轻人成为创造自身心理健康项目的伙伴”。载 K. E. Richardson（编），《校本心理健康进展：最佳实践与项目模式》。新泽西州金斯顿：Civic Research Institute。

Gergen, K. J., McNamee, S. and Associates (1999). 《关系责任：可持续对话的资源》。加州千橡市：Sage。

Gildin, B. L. (2003). “全明星才艺秀网络：草根筹资、共同体建构与参与式评估”。《青少年参与式评估：一个正在形成的领域》，《评估新方向》特刊，第 98 期，77-85。

Holzman, L. (1997). 《成长的学校：当前教育模型的激进替代方案》。新泽西州马瓦：Erlbaum。

Holzman, L. (1999). “生活即表演（如果并没有什么‘真正’正在发生，你还能实践心理学

“really” going on?). In L. Holzman (Ed.), *Performing psychology: A postmodern culture of the mind*. New York: Routledge, pp. 49-69.

Holzman, L. (2000). Performative psychology: An untapped resource for educators. *Educational and Child Psychology*, 17(3), 86-103.

Holzman, L. and Mendez, R. (Eds.), (2003). *Psychological investigations: A clinician's guide to social therapy*. New York: Brunner-Routledge.

Hood, L., McDermott, R. P. and Cole, M. (1980). “Let's try to make it a good day”-- Some not so simple ways. *Discourse Processes*, 3, 155-168.

Lobman, C. (in preparation). Improvisation: A postmodern playground for early childhood teachers. To appear in S. Ryan and S. Grieshaber (Eds.), *Putting postmodern theories into practice*. New York: JAI Press.

Lobman, C. (2003). What should we create today? Improvisational teaching in early childhood classrooms. *International Journal for Early Years Education*, 23 (2), 133-145.

Marx, K. (1967). Economic and philosophical manuscripts. In E. Fromm, *Marx's concept of man*. New York: Frederick Ungar Publishing Co. pp. 90-196.

Marx, K. (1974). Theses on Feuerbach. In K. Marx and F. Engels, *The German Ideology*. New York: International Publishers, pp. 121-3.

Massad, S. (2003). Performance of doctoring: A philosophical/methodological approach to medical conversation. *Mind / Body Medicine*, Spring.

McNamee, S. and Gergen, K. J. (Eds.), (1992). *Therapy as social construction*. London: Sage.

Morss, J. (1990). *The biologising of childhood: Developmental psychology and the Darwinian myth*. New Jersey: Erlbaum.

Morss, J. (1996). *Growing critical: Alternatives to developmental psychology*. London: Routledge.

Newman, F. and Holzman, L. (1993). *Lev Vygotsky: Revolutionary scientist*. London: Routledge.

Newman, F. and Holzman, L. (1996). *Unscientific psychology: A cultural-performatory approach to understanding human life*. Westport CT: Praeger.

Newman, F. and Holzman, L. (1997). *The end of knowing: A new developmental way of learning*. London: Routledge.

吗?)”。载 L. Holzman (编), 《表演心理学: 一种后现代心灵文化》。纽约: Routledge, 第 49-69 页。

Holzman, L. (2000). “表演性心理学: 教育者尚未开发的资源”。《教育与儿童心理学》, 17(3), 86-103。

Holzman, L. and Mendez, R. (编) (2003). 《心理学探究: 社会疗愈的临床工作者指南》。纽约: Brunner-Routledge。

Hood, L., McDermott, R. P. and Cole, M. (1980). “‘让我们试着把今天过好’——一些并不简单的方式”。《话语过程》, 3, 155-168。

Lobman, C. (准备中)。“即兴: 早期儿童教师的后现代游乐场”。将载于 S. Ryan and S. Grieshaber (编), 《将后现代理论付诸实践》。纽约: JAI Press。

Lobman, C. (2003). “今天我们应该创造什么? 早期儿童课堂中的即兴教学”。《国际早期教育期刊》, 23(2), 133-145。

Marx, K. (1967). 《经济学哲学手稿》。载 E. Fromm, 《马克思关于人的概念》。纽约: Frederick Ungar Publishing Co., 第 90-196 页。

Marx, K. (1974). 《关于费尔巴哈的提纲》。载 K. Marx and F. Engels, 《德意志意识形态》。纽约: International Publishers, 第 121-123 页。

Massad, S. (2003). “行医的表演: 医学对话的一种哲学/方法论取向”。《身心医学》, 春季号。

McNamee, S. and Gergen, K. J. (编) (1992). 《作为社会建构的治疗》。伦敦: Sage。

Morss, J. (1990). 《童年的生物化: 发展心理学与达尔文神话》。新泽西: Erlbaum。

Morss, J. (1996). 《批判地成长: 发展心理学的替代方案》。伦敦: Routledge。

Newman, F. and Holzman, L. (1993). 《列夫·维果茨基: 革命科学家》。伦敦: Routledge。

Newman, F. and Holzman, L. (1996). 《非科学心理学: 理解人类生活的一种文化—表演取向》。康涅狄格州韦斯特波特: Praeger。

Newman, F. and Holzman, L. (1997). 《知道的终结: 一种新的发展性学习方式》。伦敦: Routledge。

Sabo, K. (2003). A Vygotskian perspective on youth participatory evaluation. *Youth Participatory Evaluation: A Field in the Making*, Special Issue of *New Directions for Evaluation*, no. 98, San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.

Salit, C. R. (2003). The coach as theater director. *Journal of Excellence*, 8.

Vygotsky, L.S. (1978). *Mind in society*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Vygotsky, L. S. (1987). *The collected works of L. S. Vygotsky*. Vol. 1. New York: Plenum.

Vygotsky, L. S. (1993). *The collected works of L. S. Vygotsky*, Vol. 2. New York: Plenum.


Sabo, K. (2003). “青少年参与式评估的维果茨基视角”。《青少年参与式评估：一个正在形成的领域》，《评估新方向》特刊，第 98 期，旧金山：Jossey-Bass。

Salit, C. R. (2003). “教练作为戏剧导演”。《卓越期刊》，8。

Vygotsky, L.S. (1978). 《社会中的心智》。马萨诸塞州剑桥：哈佛大学出版社。

Vygotsky, L. S. (1987). 《L. S. 维果茨基全集》第 1 卷。纽约：Plenum。

Vygotsky, L. S. (1993). 《L. S. 维果茨基全集》第 2 卷。纽约：Plenum。



East Side Institute